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Reframing Survival: It’s about Systems not a Chain
Abstract
The medical standard of care when confronted with sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) is to follow the “Chain of
Survival” by engaging in early access, early CPR, early defibrillation and early advanced life support (ALS).
Particularly in the occupational setting, each of these actions has been identified as critical to support the
patient while awaiting assistance and transportation from the community Emergency Medical Service (EMS).
However, I present here a broader argument that restricting one’s thinking to a conception that the “likelihood
that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each of the elements is addressed” is inadequate and
misleading. Moreover, continuing to focus primarily on these individual elements is unlikely to solve to any
significant degree the complex problem of our vulnerability to death from SCA. This paper presents an
overview of this argument, offers an alternative conceptualization, and proposes ideas and actions that follow
from its logic. While specifically directed at the problem of survival following SCA, the argument presented
also addresses wider problems associated with major medical emergencies and other disasters.
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Reframing Survival: It’s about Systems not a Chain1
Larry M. Starr, PhD2
The term "Chain of Survival" was coined in 1987 to … capture the essence of 
today's ideal system of emergency cardiac care. The critical elements of this 
system: early access, early CPR, early defibrillation and early advanced life 
support, were conceptualized as interdependent links in the Chain of Survival.  
 
According to the Chain of Survival model of emergency cardiac care, the 
likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each of the 
elements is addressed.  
 
It is the timely occurrence of each of these key variables in the continuum of care 
that determines who will live and who will die.  
 
Citizen CPR Foundation 
www.citizencpr.org/chain.html 
 
The medical standard of care when confronted with sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) 
is to follow the “Chain of Survival” by engaging in early access, early CPR, early 
defibrillation and early advanced life support (ALS).  Particularly in the occupational 
setting, each of these actions has been identified as critical to support the patient while 
awaiting assistance and transportation from the community Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS).  However, I present here a broader argument that restricting one’s thinking to a 
conception that the “likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each 
of the elements is addressed” is inadequate and misleading.  Moreover, continuing to 
focus primarily on these individual elements is unlikely to solve to any significant degree 
 
1 Presented at the Emergency Cardiac Care Update 2006 Conference, Orlando, FL, June 22-25, 2006. 
2 Larry M. Starr, PhD, Director/Chair, Organizational Dynamics Programs, Graduate Division, School of 
Arts and Sciences, University of Pennsylvania, 483 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 
19104.  Email: lstarr@sas.upenn.edu
2
the complex problem of our vulnerability to death from SCA.  This paper presents an 
overview of this argument, offers an alternative conceptualization, and proposes ideas 
and actions that follow from its logic.   While specifically directed at the problem of 
survival following SCA, the argument presented also addresses wider problems 
associated with major medical emergencies and other disasters. 
Over the past 50 years, from the perspective of organizational and management 
science, two paradigm3 shifts have occurred.  Part I of this paper describes the first, the 
nature of how we think about organizations and their activities.  Part II presents the 
second, how we inquire into and think about information.  Appreciating this dual change 
is critical to efforts to cope with and manage the chaos and complexity in our 
environment including how we prepare for and respond to our vulnerability to sudden 
cardiac arrest.  Failing to integrate these shifts into plans, policies and procedures 
contributes to structural conflicts, perceptions of helplessness or impotency, and limits, 
resists or prevents efforts to change.   Part III applies the outcome of these paradigms to 
better understand, plan for and manage the problem of our vulnerability to sudden cardiac 
arrest. 
 
I.  Nature of Organizations 
When signals of possible SCA (ranging from chain pain to collapse) occur, it 
demands responses by those at the scene who recognize the presence of an emergency.   
When the scene is a formal organization, potential responders include bystanders, 
members of departments (such as safety, security, healthcare, and human resources) and 
 
3 Paradigm was the word introduced by Kuhn to describe a pattern of knowledge, rules, assumptions, or 
thinking.  Kuhn, TS. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
1962. 
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others who may be alerted or become engaged to voluntarily or by designated role 
provide support or care.  Since each organization is an independent enterprise, each has 
its own organizational structures, governance, history, culture, and sets of policies and 
procedures which inform or control the nature of planning and responses.   
When someone telephones “911,” a second organizational entity consisting of 
police, fire, and/or other designated EMS responders is summoned.  Each new person 
who arrives to help the SCA patient brings into the organizational space the structures, 
governance, history, culture, and policies and procedures of their own organization.  This 
intersection contains its own organizational dynamics.   
When EMS responders determine that advanced life support (ALS) is required, 
they provide support while transporting the patient to a third organization, the community 
medical institution.  At this facility the patient is delivered into the hands of medical and 
allied medical personnel with their own structures, governance, history, culture, policies 
and procedures.  At this intersection there may be dynamics informed by all three 
organizations plus the social forces from the community support system (e.g., relatives 
and friends) of which the patient’s family is a part.  
Therefore, from an organizational perspective, while SCA may occur at a single 
organization, its treatment and management involves forces from multiple organizations, 
each of which is likely to have its own structures, governance, history, culture, policies 
and procedures.   
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Mechanical Metaphor  
It is common to use metaphors to think about complex structures such as 
organizations.  From the time of the Industrial Revolution until World War II, for 
example, the prevailing metaphor for organizations was a machine with an internal 
structure that performed with regularity and with actions that followed causal laws of 
physical order.  Just as one could assemble parts to build a locomotive engine, so could 
an organization be created.  Just as each engine part performed a simple and specific 
function, so could the organization effectively operate if each person performed a simple 
task.  This generalization from the construction and operation of a mechanical device to 
the coordination and behavior of people transformed much of society from agricultural to 
industrial.   
 At the core of the mechanistic organizational metaphor is simple premise: the 
parts (people) are “mindless,” i.e., they have no purposes of their own.  Once selected 
(hired and trained if necessary) it is assumed that each employee will function as 
designed by the user which was generally to achieve (for owners or leaders) either wealth 
or a comparable index of power.  The important attributes of this “person-as-tool” 
approach are reliability, efficiency, controllability and predictability.  As long as the 
environment remains stable (or did not interfere), the parts (all mindless) have no choice 
other than to work as assigned.  Indeed, it would be inconceivable to assume a tractor’s 
ignition would “decide” not to transmit power when activated.  The mindset of the 
mechanistic organizational metaphor is that an employee would never question whether 
or not to do the assigned job.   
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Biological Metaphor  
Following the end of World War II, in Europe and in the United States a second 
organization model emerged that used a biological metaphor.  The assumptions of this 
mode of thinking are that organizations are similar to human beings with organic parts 
(people) that are more difficult to replace than those in a tractor engine but are yet 
“unminded.”   The purpose of the organization, like all living organisms, is to survive 
often by growing, adapting, developing, and exploiting the environment.  In contrast to a 
mechanistic model in which profit is the end state or goal, the biological model suggests 
that profit is the means to its survival thus allowing corporate wealth to be appreciated as 
a social good and an acceptable argument supporting the American Way of Life.  Indeed, 
most agreed with the chairman of General Motors Corporation when he proclaimed, in 
the 1960’s, that "what's good for GM is good for America."   
 While a higher biological entity has choices about its means and ends, the parts do 
not.  They react to stimuli from the outside and from other internal parts similar to a 
thermostat.  For example, the heart cannot decide on its own not to pump blood, and the 
stomach cannot decide not to hold or digest food.  There is no independent 
consciousness, conflict, or choice among any organ or body part.  An important 
difference with a machine, however, is the presence of the single brain, operating with 
executive function (through a communication network) that can autonomously issue 
directives to activate the parts.   
 Since the existence of a brain makes it plausible for some parts (people) within a 
biological organism (organization) to decide to act on their own, an outcome that would 
be considered disastrous for the executives of an organization, many biological 
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organizations tend to operate with a paternalistic, top-down, “command-and-control” 
structural framework.  This supports the one-brain-in-charge metaphor in which a 
corporation (“corpus”) is directed by the chief executive who is the “head” of the 
company.  Indeed, this model rarely considers or uses psychological characteristics of the 
people who work in organizations as relevant to operational or management activities. 
 
Socio-Cultural Metaphor 
 Within the past 30 years, a third framework has been conceptualized, the socio-
cultural metaphor.  A socio-cultural view considers the organization to be a voluntary 
association of multi-minded purposeful members each of whom has a choice of 
individual means and ends (goals).  When the parts of a system display choice, neither a 
mechanistic or biological model can effectively explain, predict or effectively control 
activity except on a temporary basis.  As a purposeful entity, an organization has 
individually purposeful parts (employees at all levels); the organization itself has multiple 
and sometimes conflicting purposes; and everyone is part of larger purposeful whole, the 
society in which many organizations and individuals co-exist.  This inherent hierarchy – 
individual, organization, society – is so interconnected that addressing threats and 
challenges within any one level often may not be accomplished by operating within that 
same level.  Only by aligning the interests of the purposeful parts between each other, 
each level, and that of the whole can the system function optimally.   Also essential to 
this modern socio-cultural metaphor is that attention must be given to personality 
differences, personal, political and social needs, the meaning of organization change to 
participants, and other components of human nature, growth, or change.   
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II. Nature of Thinking about Information 
For approximately 400 years, classical science including medical science has been 
preoccupied with independent variables.  This type of thinking is rooted in analytic 
geometry where one basic axiom is that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts.  To 
understand the behavior of a mathematical whole, analysis addresses through reduction 
and summation how each individual part (independent variable) affects the whole.  
Analytic thinking is the method of inquiry used in most science – physical, biological 
and social - and promotes rigorous, controlled experimentation and evaluation.  Indeed to 
deviate from analytic methods often suggests weakness, lack of statistical power, and 
absence of scientific “evidence-based” validity. 
 The steps of analytic thinking are these:  (1) Take apart that which one seeks to 
understand; (2) Try to explain the behavior of the parts taken separately; (3) Reassemble 
the parts to provide an understanding of the whole.  
Analytic thinking has been commonly used to understand organizational 
activities.  For example, it is assumed that analysis can be used to improve an 
organization’s efficiency or productivity.  The approach is to divide/reduce the 
components (structures, procedures, products, services, etc.) into small parts and to 
optimize each.  It is similarly assumed that organizational distress or failure can be 
sought by searching for a failure within individual components, and that overall 
enhancement will follow when the performance of one or more causal parts are improved 
independently until the slack between them is used up.  Analytic thinking results in the 
belief that one person can be the primary cause of overall organizational success.  
Analytic thinking also can result in the attribution that the cause for organizational 
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inefficiency or poor productivity lies with a specific department such as safety, sales, 
marketing, and/or finance, or, unfortunately, to a specific person.  The preferred method 
of solving an analytic problem is to “restructure,” i.e., to eliminate, outsource, replace or 
combine the (independent) functions or parts.   
Analytic thinking is linear in that it assumes that the parts will add up to the 
whole.  For example, this premise makes it reasonable to assume that if company sales 
are inadequate, one could intervene by addressing one or more of the components that 
cause sales, as is presented in the following relationship and diagrammed in Figure 1. 
 
Sales = Economy + Performance and Quality + Competition + Price + Interest Rates 
 
Figure 1. Linear Contributors of Organizational Sales 
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Chain of Survival Metaphor
The Chain of Survival is described as an ideal system of emergency cardiac care.  
Using a metaphoric chain of response links (i.e., early access, early CPR, early 
defibrillation and early advanced life support), it proposes that if each element is 
appropriate addressed, i.e., optimized, the likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac 
arrest increases.  The Chain of Survival presented below and diagrammed in Figure 2 is 
another example assumed to be an analytic linear sequence. 
 
Survival Rate = Early Access + Early CPR + Early AED + Early ALS 
 
Figure 2. Linear Contributors to SCA Survival 
 
In line with this analytic approach and based on data collected between 1976 and 
1991 in Seattle, a predictive model of survival4 calculated the relative contribution of 
each independent link.  This was written as a linear regression equation, 
 
4 Larsen, MP, Eisenberg MS, Cummins RO, Hallstrom AP.  Predicting survival from out-of-hospital 
cardiac arrest: A graphic model. Annals of Emergency Medicine. 1993;22(11):1652-1658. 
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Survival Rate     =   67% at collapse – 2.3% per minute to CPR – 1.1% per minute to 
defibrillation – 2.1% per minute to ACLS 
As noted by the authors (p. 1656), 
 
The regression constant, 67%, represents the probability of survival in the 
hypothetical situation in which all treatments are delivered immediately on 
collapse to patients with prehospital cardiac arrest … With delays in CPR, 
defibrillatory shock, and definitive care, the magnitude of the decline in survival 
rate per minute is the sum of the three coefficients (-2.2%, -1.1%, -2.1%), or –
5.5%.  
 
While analytic thinking can help one understand the nature of inanimate objects, 
it often fails to capture the complete nature of dynamic, homeostatic, cybernetic5 or 
organizational systems where human beings have roles.  This is because the underlying 
assumption that all the parts (i.e., people, teams, departments) are independent of one 
another does not apply to organizations particularly when the activity is socio-cultural.
Thus, the linear regression equation offered by Larsen, Eisenberg, et al is of little 
prescriptive help because it only considers characteristics of independent components 
rather than the interaction between the parts.  To address the complexity of managing 
SCA which is often characterized by multi-minded purposeful members from multiple 
organizations requires a paradigm shift from analytic to systemic thinking.   
When one makes inquiries systemically, a different process is used.  A systems 
thinking approach considers each sub-system in the context of the larger whole of which 
it is a component and studies the roles played by all.  Rather than examining or treating 
 
5 Athey, TH. The systematic systems approach. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982. 
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each independent part, a systems thinking approach examines the interdependencies 
between parts and considers ways to synthesize or combine parts to enhance the whole.  
For example, from a systems perspective, the relationship among sales and other 
organizational forces could be portrayed as in Figure 3.  As shown, the interrelationships 
are non-linear and complex; it is not clear where to make intervention(s) in order to 
optimize sales.  Organizational sales improvement is complex because sales are assumed 
to be both a cause and effect of other activities, many of which interact with other forces.  
The challenge in an organizational systems approach is to determine the best combination 
of forces necessary to ensure a desired level of sales. 
 
Figure 3.  Systemic Contributions of Organizational Sales 
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Also complex and non-linear are the risk factors associated with heart diseases in 
general and SCA in particular.  While many understand that smoking is not the direct 
cause of a heart attack, from a systems framework, the relationship between smoking and 
the heart is complex (see Figure 4 based on Gharajedaghi, 19996).   
 
Smoking HeartAnxiety
(+) Reduces
(-) Hardens
(-) Desire 
to Repeat
(+) Short-term
Good for
Lungs Oxygen
(-)
Negatively
Affects
(-)
Negatively
Affects
Weight
Figure 4. Systemic Relationship Between Smoking and the Heart
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Complex organizational interactions are often difficult to understand and manage 
particularly if one is using an inappropriate thinking strategy.  Flood and Jackson (1991)7
suggest that a systems approach is essential when the conditions noted in Table 1 exist. 
 
6 Gharajedaghi, J. Systems thinking: Managing chaos and complexity. Boston, MA: Butterworth 
Heinemann, 1999. 
7 Flood, RL and Jackson, MC. Creative problem solving: Total systems intervention. Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1991 
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Table 1. When Systems Thinking is Appropriate (Flood and Jackson, 1991) 
 
1. There are a large number of elements (e.g., subsystems, departments, people) 
2. There are many interactions among the elements 
3. Attributes of the elements are not predetermined (e.g., the characteristics of 
people and what they do during an interaction are not completely known in 
advance) 
4. Interaction among the elements is loosely organized (e.g., specific lines of 
authority, roles and responsibilities are not fixed) 
5. The parts are probabilistic in their behavior (e.g., actions are based on 
probabilities rather than fixed physical laws) 
6. The system evolves over time  
7. “Sub-systems” are purposeful and generate their own goals (e.g., a person or 
group can change their mind or become distracted rather than adhere to set goals) 
8. The system is subject to behavioral influences from within or outside (e.g., 
powerful others can alter the nature of what is done or how events unfold) 
 9. The system is largely open to environment   
From a systems perspective, the problem of survival following SCA is influenced 
by the complex forces summarized in Figure 5 and presented in detail in Figures 5a, 5b, 
5c and 5d.  The four links of the Chain of Survival are highlighted in Figure 5 and can be 
seen as parts that rather than acting as independent predictors interact with many others in 
the overall system.   To ensure an effective outcome (i.e., to increase the probability of 
survival from SCA) the whole system should be addressed rather than any of the parts. 
Figure 5 presents the complete SCA system with four continuous cycles framed in 
terms of their function (what must be done), structure (the parts involved), process (how 
the functions are carried out) and purpose (why the functions are carried out by the 
parts).  This allows one to understand how the intentions, plans, behaviors and outcomes 
of all components are interrelated within each subsystem and within the entire system of 
which each is a component.  
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Structure (Parts)
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(How)
Purpose (Why)
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SCA 
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Early CPR/AED
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First Responders
EMS Responders
Community Medical Responders
Figure 5. System of Survival From SCA
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Figure 5a. Design/Plan/Prepare
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Figure 5b. Workplace First Responders
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1
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Figure 5c. EMS
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2
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Figure 5d. Definitive Care in Medical Center
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III. Reframing Survival and SCA 
 Thinking about SCA survival in a systemic framework offers a number of 
important recommendations.   The following are some of the many examples that rather 
than optimizing any one part considers how to enhance the relationship between parts in 
order to ensure the integrity of the entire system.    
 
Functional Considerations
When considering the overall function of the system, the design of plans to 
manage SCA should integrate the interests, obligations and needs of the entire system.  
Therefore, plans should have attributes and values agreed upon and understood by all and 
rather than three plans, each designed for others to understand and follow, there should be 
one plan that integrates everyone but with sections that apply to each subsystem.  The 
plan should identify appropriate categories such as risks and hazards; stakeholders with 
relevant interests and competencies; required medical, legal, ethical and social policies 
and expectations; educational and technological resources; and the nature of how to 
ensure effective communication among all involved.   
Since a single plan must account for all stakeholders, the following groups should 
be included in its design: management from the organization preparing for SCA, and 
representatives or designated responders from that organization; EMS administration that 
controls who will be sent to local organizations and all EMS responders who may be on 
duty when “911” requires a response; and management and responders in the medical 
center who are likely to interact with the patient and/or representatives from the patient’s 
workplace, EMS responders and administration.  If local organizations do not integrate 
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with EMS the planning of how SCA will be managed when EMS arrive at their facility, 
or if they do not determine the nature of how the local emergency department integrates 
with EMS and their own workplace, the likelihood of smooth interface and 
communication are reduced.  These and other aspects of coordinated planning are 
essential when SCA occurs. 
 
Structural Considerations
The structural aspects of managing SCA concern integrating the parts identified 
in the written plan. Structural parts include people (and groups), information (including 
policies, regulations and documentation), products (including technology) and services 
(including follow-up replacement).  To ensure structural integration involves determining 
what the parts share, as well as what conflicts and absences exist among the subsystems.  
Since the written plan should address organizational stakeholders, policies, and 
procedures, one important structural part is the nature of the governance structure, i.e., 
specifying who is in charge when subsystems come together.  Integrating the structure of 
governance across the groups may be important if a workplace has personnel who are as 
qualified or more qualified than those from EMS, or if treatment is being directed by a 
qualified health care practitioner when EMS expects to “take charge.”  Governance 
should not be decided on the scene; it should be thought about carefully in advance, 
included in the system planning, and carried out as agreed by all involved. 
 Clearly specifying the technology or equipment that will be available for use 
during SCA is also a topic that should be integrated.  If a workplace has lifesaving 
equipment that is likely to be used with a patient until EMS arrives or there are 
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communication devices that could be helpful, this information should be known by EMS 
to ensure that they understand what resources are likely and so equipment can be matched 
or integrated, if needed.   If there are special patient needs (patient history) or unique 
workplace threats/hazards (construction or other access barriers) these should be 
understood by EMS and the medical center which will receive the patient.  Because 
communication among the subsystems should be integrated, technology should be 
available to ensure all participants have equal access and effectiveness.   
 
Process Considerations
Process concerns how the plans will be carried out using the designated 
structural parts. If the overall plan identified the need to provide resuscitation when 
SCA is recognized, one important item of equipment would be an automated external 
defibrillator (AED).  A related structural part would be the resources to ensure that 
personnel were educated (and up-to-date) in how to perform CPR and use an AED.  The 
process would concern – as an example – how to communicate that a person had 
collapsed and that EMS was needed; how to get the AED to the site of the emergency so 
trained people could use it; how other equipment (also brought to the scene) would be 
integrated with it; how information about its use would be communicated to others, if 
needed; how personnel would work cooperatively during resuscitation; and how the AED 
would be serviced after its use.   Process requirements similar to these should be 
understood by all before EMS arrives, while EMS transitions then takes responsibility for 
the patient, and when EMS transitions with the medical center. 
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 Since process among the subsystems should be integrated, it suggests that 
common rather than unique equipment and technology would be preferred.  It may be 
possible, for example, to redesign the communication process so that a telephone call 
made to “911” would not only provide a request to send EMS responders, but would also 
open a communication channel with EMS and the hospital emergency department.  This 
would make it possible for all subsystems to engage in information exchange while the 
first responders attended to the SCA victim (and thereby received support or advice) 
while waiting for the arrival of EMS.  When EMS was in route to the patient, while at the 
scene then during their transport to the medical center, all groups would have continuous 
information access and update.  A telephone line that made the connection as soon as the 
AED turned on would enable this.  
 
Purpose Considerations
The purpose of the system addresses why the functions, structures, and 
processes are needed. Within each subsystem the answer is similar: to increase the 
probability of survival following SCA and to protect the health and safety of the people 
engaged in response efforts, and the organizational structures of which all are a part.  As 
survival from SCA is influenced by the integration of all subsystems, not the activities of 
one part, the value of working together should be understood and agreed upon. 
When a person collapses due to SCA, I argue that “who will live and who will 
die” - is not determined by merely engaging in early access, early CPR, early AED and 
early ALS.  Many more interrelated forces influence survival.  Broadly, these involve the 
nature and expectations about people and their work within organizations, and how those 
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involved in planning and responding think about reality and information.  More 
specifically, survival involves the details of how preparation and response plans are 
designed, what components are specified, how the activities are carried out, and why 
those involved agree to participate. These translate into the degree of perceived threat, 
quality of planning, governance, structure, culture, education and resources allocated.   
 I argue that the Chain of Survival metaphor, in terms of organizational 
components and in its conception, is not a “system” because it does not address the 
degree to which organizations, EMS and community medical personnel are integrated.  
This is not a Workplace or EMS or Medical Center problem.  Rather, it is the 
responsibility of every organization in the community system of which all are parts to 
accomplish this integration.  Less important and of less value for patient survival are 
efforts that focus on any one part, as if the solution to the patient survival problem could 
be found by optimizing any one level.  More important for patient survival is to 
understand and bring together the organizational system parts, all of which have purposes 
and interests, then align and interrelate the parts within the whole.  
 
_________________ 
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